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Abstract
We analyze the bargaining problem of an incumbent ￿rm and a union when the wage
contract becomes generally binding. Our main application relates to competition among
operators of mail delivery networks. We describe the Deutsche Post case which highlights
the raising rivals￿costs incentive and its consequences resulting from labor laws that make
collective agreements generally binding. We show that minimum wages implemented by
means of extension regulation are an e⁄ective deterrence instrument which frustrates both
market entry as well as investments into the build-up of a mail delivery network.
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11 Introduction
In this paper we analyze the bargaining problem of an incumbent ￿rm and a union when a
collectively agreed upon wage contract becomes the minimum wage in the entire industry. This
is typically the case in Germany, where collective wage agreements between a union and an
employers￿association can be made compulsory even for independent employers through so-
called extension rules.1
In contrast to previous works on raising rivals￿(wage) cost strategies we analyze the case
where labor costs are mainly ￿xed operating costs. We consider a market with an incumbent
￿rm and an entrant ￿rm. The employees of the incumbent ￿rm are represented by a union,
while none of the workers of the entrant ￿rm is organized. The incumbent ￿rm and the union
bargain about a collective wage agreement. We compare two labor market regimes depending
on whether or not the agreed upon wage becomes generally binding for all employees in the
industry. Our results highlight the raising rivals￿cost incentives of both bargaining parties (the
incumbent ￿rm and the labor union) when an extension rule is in place. When ￿rms￿wage bills
constitute ￿xed costs, then generally binding (minimum) wages become an extremely e⁄ective
deterrence device such that even a more e¢ cient rival can be deterred from entering the industry.
Our main application is the Deutsche Post case which nicely highlights the parties￿incentives
and the consequences of labor laws which make collective agreements generally binding. In
Germany, the Posted Workers Act of 1996 allows the Federal Ministry of Labor to implement
minimum wages in certain service industries, as e.g., postal services. In contrast to minimum
wage legislations in other countries, minimum wages in Germany are based on existing collective
contracts which are typically the outcome of negotiations between the established industry union
and incumbent ￿rms (organized within an employer association). The Federal Ministry of Labor
can then decide to declare such an existing collective contract generally binding. Quite obviously,
that procedure tends to neglect new and entrant ￿rms￿(and their employees￿ ) interests. And
even worse, the procedure of declaring collective wage contracts generally binding may be used
strategically by the incumbent players to directly harm entrant ￿rms. This is exactly what
1German labor market institutions and extension regulations are decribed in Haucap et al. 2006. Below
we identify the key elements of labor laws in Germany which implement industry-speci￿c minimum wages via
extension regulations.
2happens in the Deutsche Post case.
Our paper is related to Williamson (1968) who showed that an incumbent ￿rm may accept
high wage rates if this also raises rivals￿costs (see also Haucap et al. 2001). Precisely, Williamson
(1968) analyzed the so-called Pennington case and he argued that an industry-wide wage contract
which increases the cost of relative labor-intense ￿rms to a larger extent than the costs of
relative capital-intensive ￿rms can be used to force labor intensive ￿rms to withdraw from the
market. Quite generally, the raising rivals￿cost literature assumes that the strategic variable
(as, e.g., a generally binding minimum wage rate) impacts directly on ￿rms￿variable costs (see
Salop and Sche⁄man 1983, 1987). In those settings a necessary condition for making a raising
rivals￿cost strategy pro￿table is that the rival ￿rms￿labor productivity (in the case of wage
being the strategic variable) is smaller than the ￿rm￿ s labor productivity which executes the
anticompetitive practice. As a consequence, overall productive e¢ ciency may very well increase
as the more productive ￿rm gains market shares while less productive ￿rms lose market shares.
Our analysis of a setting where labor costs are ￿xed costs reveals that a raising rivals￿costs
strategy may also be pro￿table when rival ￿rms are more e¢ cient. Hence, the adverse e⁄ects of
labor laws which make wages generally binding are likely to be more pronounced when ￿rms￿
labor costs are ￿xed.
We also examine how the presence of wage extension regulations impacts on the entrant ￿rm￿ s
incentives to invest into its mail delivery network which determines the entrant￿ s coverage. We
show that an entrant may never invest into building up its own delivery network irrespectively
of the e⁄ectivity of its investment cost function. If investments take place, then an entrant will
enter with a network which entails a smaller coverage when compared with the case without an
extension rule. Hence, besides more standard (static) anticompetitive e⁄ects, minimum wage
legislation unfolds additional adverse dynamic e⁄ects on the entrant￿ s willingness to invest into
the coverage of its own mail delivery network.
Our paper contributes to the literature which analyzes the interplay between monopolized
labor markets and oligopolistic product markets (￿unionized oligopolies￿ ). Since Dewatripont
(1987, 1988) and Horn and Wolinsky (1988a,b) this literature has been focusing on both the
properties of the union-￿rm bargaining problem and labor market institutions. Accordingly, our
model delivers new insights on the nature of union-￿rm bargaining when labor costs are ￿xed
3costs and the e⁄ects of labor laws which make wage contracts generally binding.
Our paper is related to the literature on entry barriers (Dixit 1979). Most importantly,
we extend the paper by Rogerson (1984) who shows that under symmetric cost conditions a
dominant ￿rm has incentives to raise ￿xed entry cost. In Rogerson (1984) the level of ￿xed
entry costs is exogenously given, while in our analysis the ￿xed labor costs of operating a mail
delivery network are the outcome of negotiations between the union and the incumbent operator.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we introduce the set-up of our model and
in Section 3 we derive and compare the industry equilibria depending on whether or not an
extension regulation is in place. In Section 4 we examine how the di⁄erent labor market regimes
a⁄ect the entrant￿ s incentives to invest into the coverage of its mail delivery network. Section
5 describes the legal foundations of collective bargaining in Germany and the regulations which
transform collective wage agreements into generally binding minimum wages. Section 6 provides
an extensive discussion of the Deutsche Post case which highlights the raising rivals￿cost in-
centives and their consequences when the collective wage agreement becomes generally binding.
Finally, Section 7 concludes.
2 The Model
We assume an incumbent ￿rm i = 1 and an entrant ￿rm i = 2. We think of the ￿rms as postal
network operators which o⁄er mail delivery services. The incumbent ￿rm operates a delivery
network by employing a ￿xed volume of mailmen services, ￿1 > 0, which guarantees a certain
mail service quality (e.g., maximum delivery transit times). Hence, the incumbent￿ s labor costs
of operating its mail delivery network are ￿xed costs which are independent of the overall mail
volume. For a given wage rate w1, the incumbent￿ s total labor costs are then given by ￿1w1.
In addition, the incumbent￿ s (non-labor) marginal costs of mail delivery service are given by
c1 = c ￿ 0.
With regard to the entrant ￿rm￿ s costs we also assume that labor costs for operating its own
delivery network constitute ￿xed costs with ￿2w2.2 The entrant has (non-labor) marginal costs
2We focus on competition between delivery network operators. By that we abstract from the issues of access
regulation which may counter competitors￿incentives to set-up own delivery networks (as, e.g., in the UK where
relatively low access prices prevail). See Armstrong (2008) for a model of optimal access prices in postal service
4of c2 = c + ￿, where ￿ stands for the relative cost e¢ ciency of the entrant ￿rm. The relative
cost e¢ ciency of the entrant increases with lower values of ￿. We suppose that the entrant
￿rm￿ s mail delivery network is more e¢ cient when compared with the incumbent ￿rm￿ s delivery
technology, so that ￿1 ￿ ￿2 holds (we measure the relative network e¢ ciency of the entrant by
the ratio ￿2=￿1 ￿ 1, where a lower value indicates a higher e¢ ciency level).
We assume a linear inverse demand for mail services p(X) = a ￿ X, with a > c, where
X := x1 + x2 stands for the sum of mail services o⁄ered by the incumbent, x1, and the entrant
￿rm, x2, respectively. Firms determine their mail service supplies xi (e.g., through outlets and
sorting capacities) which are perceived as homogenous by consumers.3 In the following it is
useful to de￿ne ￿ := a ￿ c.
All workers of the incumbent ￿rm are represented by a union which maximizes the wage bill
L = w1￿1 of its members. We suppose that all workers in the sector have the same reservation
wage ￿ ￿ 0 (which is typically determined by unemployment bene￿ts). We assume collective
wage bargaining between the incumbent ￿rm and the union. The union￿ s disagreement point
is then given by ￿￿1. We apply the Nash bargaining solution to solve for the wage settlement
(Nash 1950).
Workers of the entrant ￿rm are assumed to be not organized in a union. Hence, in the
absence of an extension rule, the entrant is able to hire workers at their reservation wage ￿.
We consider the following two stage game: In the ￿rst stage, the incumbent ￿rm and the
union bargain about the wage rate. In the second stage, the incumbent and the entrant simul-
taneously determine their mail volume capacities (i.e., compete ￿ la Cournot).4
We distinguish two labor market regimes depending on whether or not an extension rule
is in place. If no extension rule exists, then the entrant ￿rm pays the reservation wage to its
employees while the incumbent bargains with the union about the wage rate, b w1, which only
markets.
3Because of the linearity of our model we can reinterpret ￿ as measuring vertical product di⁄erentiation (see
H￿ckner 2000).
4We interpret Cournot competition in the sense of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983) such that the postal operators
are assumed to set ￿rst their mail capacities and then compete in prices. As shown by the authors, that game
yields the Cournot outcome if products are homogeneous. In addition, we suppose that both ￿rms￿mail delivery
networks are su¢ ciently large to guarantee a certain delivery quality for their supplied mail volumes.
5applies to its own employees. In contrast, if an extension rule is in place, then the entrant ￿rm
must pay the (minimum) wage, w, which is determined jointly by the union and the incumbent
￿rm.
At this point some more general remarks are helpful to specify a meaningful parameter range
for our linear model. Let us denote the net revenue of ￿rm i by Ri = [p(X) ￿ ci]xi for i = 1;2.







j), for i = 1;2, i 6= j.
As products are homogenous, di⁄erences in ￿rms￿equilibrium quantities only depend on ￿ and
are independent of the wage rate. Quite generally, in a Cournot duopoly model increasing the
relative cost e¢ ciency of one ￿rm leads to a relative increase of the ￿rm￿ s equilibrium output;
i.e., @x￿
1=@￿ > 0 and @x￿
2=@￿ < 0 holds, with x￿
1 = x￿
2 at ￿ = 0.5 We specify that x￿
2(￿) > 0
and x￿
1(￿) > 0 holds for all admissible ￿, so that the range of ￿ is restricted to an interval
which guarantees strictly positive output levels for both ￿rms.





(where the superscript ￿D￿ stands for the duopoly outcome in the product market). As we
assumed constant marginal costs, we obtain dRD
1 =d￿ > 0 and dRD




Our approach implies that the wage rate only a⁄ects ￿rms￿pro￿t levels but not optimal
quantity choices. We assume that workers￿reservation wage is su¢ ciently low such that RD
2 ￿
￿2￿ > 0 holds. For all admissible ￿, this assumption ensures that the entrant ￿rm always ￿nds it
pro￿table to enter the market whenever it pays the reservation wage to its employees operating
the mail delivery network. Similarly, we assume that RD
1 ￿ ￿1￿ > 0 holds for all admissible
￿, so that the incumbent operates with a strictly positive pro￿t if it pays the reservation wage
under duopoly. This assumption also ensures that the joint surplus of the union-incumbent
relationship is strictly positive implying, in turn, a negotiated wage strictly larger than workers￿
reservation wage.
Given that an extension rule exists, the entrant ￿rm must pay the generally binding wage
rate, w, which is the outcome of bilateral bargaining between the union and the incumbent ￿rm.
5See Vives (1999) for a general treatment of the Cournot oligopoly model and the conditions which ensure
￿intuitive￿comparative statics.
6Clearly, as long as the entrant￿ s net revenue RD
2 is not smaller than its ￿xed labor costs, w￿2,
the entrant will enter the market. We denote the limit wage, where RD
2 = w￿2 holds, by e w.
Note that de w=d￿ < 0 and de w=d￿2 < 0 which says that the limit wage decreases as the entrant￿ s
cost e¢ ciency or its network e¢ ciency decreases, respectively.
If w ￿ e w, then the entrant does not enter the market and the incumbent realizes the
monopoly net revenue RM
1 := R1(xM
1 ), with xM
1 = argmaxx1 [p(x1) ￿ c1]x1 (where the su-
perscript ￿M￿ stands for the monopoly outcome in the product market). Note that RM
1 is
independent of both ￿ and w. We now invoke the assumption that RM
1 > e w￿1 ￿ (￿1=￿2)RD
2
which guarantees the existence of a limit wage e w which leaves the incumbent with a strictly
positive payo⁄ at the limit wage. This assumption guarantees scope for entry deterrence as,
otherwise, the incumbent would always be better o⁄ under the duopoly outcome.
Taking these considerations together, we can formulate the following assumption which we
maintain throughout the entire analysis.
Assumption 1. We invoke the following parameter restrictions.
i) ￿ 2 (￿￿; ￿
2) which ensures that both ￿rms￿equilibrium quantities are strictly positive,
whenever the entrant ￿rm enters the market.









which ensures that both the incumbent and the entrant ￿rm make








which guarantees that the incumbent￿ s pro￿t is strictly positive at the limit
wage, e w.
Part iii) of Assumption 1 mirrors the fact that entry deterrence is in principle possible as the
incumbent realizes monopoly net revenues which are larger than the wage bill at the limit wage.
This constellation is guaranteed by imposing an upper limit on the relative network e¢ ciency
of the entrant. However, the share the incumbent may get from the realized monopoly revenues
may be quite small when the limit wage becomes large.
3 Equilibrium Analysis
We ￿rst analyze the equilibrium when no extension rule is in place. Then, we turn to the
case where an extension rule makes the wage agreement between the incumbent and the union
7generally in the entire industry. Finally, we compare the results under both labor market regimes.
Bargaining without extension rule. We ￿rst analyze the equilibrium when no extension
rule is in place. The pro￿t functions of the incumbent and the entrant are given by
￿1 = (￿ ￿ X)x1 ￿ w1￿1 and ￿2 = (￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ X)x2 ￿ w2￿2,
respectively, from which we obtain the ￿rst-order conditions
￿ ￿ 2x1 ￿ x2 = 0 and ￿ ￿ ￿ ￿ 2x2 ￿ x1 = 0,











1 = [(￿ + ￿)=3]
2 and RD
2 = [(￿ ￿ 2￿)=3]
2. In the absence of an extension rule, the




2 ￿ ￿￿2. (1)
We now turn to the ￿rst stage of the game, where the union bargains with the incumbent ￿rm
about the wage rate w1. We apply the Nash bargaining solution which requires that the joint
surplus RD
1 = [(￿ + ￿)=3]
2 is shared equally relative to the union￿ s disagreement point ￿￿1 (the
incumbent￿ s disagreement point is zero). Hence, the equilibrium wage bill, b w1￿1, must ful￿ll
RD
1 ￿ b w1￿1 = b w1￿1 ￿ ￿￿1. (2)
The following proposition follows immediately from solving Equation (2) for the wage rate, b w1,
the incumbent￿ s pro￿t and the union￿ s wage bill.
Proposition 1. Suppose that no extension rule exists. Then the entrant ￿rm always enters the
market, pays its employees the reservation wage and realizes the pro￿t level b ￿D
2 = RD
2 ￿￿￿2. In





























By Assumption 1, the entrant ￿rm enters the market with a strictly positive quantity and
receives strictly positive pro￿ts. Comparing both ￿rms￿pro￿t levels (1) and (3), we observe
that the entrant typically realize a higher pro￿t level than the incumbent. To see this, suppose
that both ￿rms are equally cost e¢ cient (i.e., ￿ = 0). Then comparison of (1) and (3) yields
that b ￿D
2 > b ￿D
1 , ￿￿2 < (1=2)(RD
1 +￿￿1), where the latter inequality holds always as we assumed
￿1 ￿ ￿2 and RD
1 > ￿￿1. The obvious reason for this result is that the incumbent must share
its surplus with the union, while the entrant pays its workers￿the reservation wage. However,
the incumbent￿ s pro￿t can be larger than the entrant￿ s pro￿t if the entrant￿ s cost e¢ ciency is
su¢ ciently small (i.e., ￿ positive and su¢ ciently large).
Bargaining with extension rule. In the case of an extension rule, the outcome of the
negotiations between the union and the incumbent ￿rm determines the minimum wage rate, w,
which is binding for all ￿rms in the industry. With an extension rule in place, ￿rms￿optimal
strategies in the second stage remain una⁄ected as long as the entrant ￿rm ￿nds it optimal
to enter the market. This is the case as long as ￿2 = RD
2 ￿ w￿2 > 0 holds. However, if the
agreed upon wage rate does not fall short of the limit wage, w ￿ e w, then the incumbent sets
the monopoly output level, xM
1 = ￿=2, and realizes the monopoly net revenues, RM
1 = (￿=2)
2,
in the product market. Depending on the generally binding wage rate, w, the incumbent ￿rm￿ s






1 ￿ w￿1 = (￿=2)
2 ￿ w￿1 for w ￿ e w
RD
1 ￿ w￿1 = [(￿ + ￿)=3]
2 ￿ w￿1 for ￿ ￿ w < e w.
Let us assume for a moment that bargaining only occurs over a certain wage rate. We can then
state the corresponding bargaining frontier, ￿(￿1), which gives the maximum payo⁄of the union






1 ￿ ￿1 for 0 ￿ ￿1 ￿ RM
1 ￿ e w￿1
RD
1 ￿ ￿1 for RM
1 ￿ e w￿1 < ￿1 ￿ RD
1 ￿ ￿￿1.
(4)
We, therefore, obtain a non-convex bargaining problem if
RD
1 ￿ ￿￿1 > RM
1 ￿ e w￿1 (5)
9holds. Condition (5) requires that the joint surplus under duopoly net of the wage bill at the
reservation wage is strictly larger than the joint surplus under monopoly net of the wage bill at
the limit wage. In those instances, the incumbent would be able to realize a larger payo⁄ under
duopoly than under monopoly if it had all the bargaining power.
If, to the contrary, Condition (5) does not hold, then the bargaining frontier is described by
L(￿1) = RM
1 ￿￿1 for 0 ￿ ￿1 ￿ RM
1 ￿ e w￿1. In that case, we obtain a convex bargaining problem.
In the former case, however, we have to use lotteries to ￿convexify￿the bargaining frontier. We
do this by allowing for bargaining over a lottery l = (e w;￿;p;1￿p) which chooses the limit wage,
e w, with probability p 2 [0;1] and the reservation wage, ￿, with counter probability 1 ￿ p. We
assume that the union and the incumbent are risk-neutral.6






1 ￿ ￿1 for 0 ￿ ￿1 ￿ RM
1 ￿ e w￿1
[pe w + (1 ￿ p)￿]￿1 for RM
1 ￿ e w￿1 < ￿1 ￿ RD
1 ￿ ￿￿1,
(6)
where the lottery ful￿lls
[pe w + (1 ￿ p)￿]￿1 = e w￿1 ￿
e w￿1 ￿ ￿￿1
(RD
1 ￿ ￿￿1) ￿ (RM




1 ￿ ￿1 e w)
￿
.
Applying the Nash bargaining solution to the convexi￿ed bargaining frontier (6) and noting
the union￿ s disagreement payo⁄, ￿￿1, we obtain the following proposition which summarizes the
bargaining outcome under an extension rule.
Proposition 2. Suppose that an extension rule exists. If RD
1 ￿￿￿1 ￿ RM
1 ￿ e w￿1, then entry is









1 + ￿￿1) for RM
1 ￿ e w￿1 ￿ e w￿1 ￿ ￿￿1
e w for RM
1 ￿ e w￿1 ￿ e w￿1 ￿ ￿￿1.
6By allowing for bargaining over lotteries and assuming von Neumann-Morgenstern expected utilities, our
model ful￿lls the axioms of the Nash bargaining solution in expected terms. One may question whether bargain-
ing over lotteries and the requirement to implement the ex post outcome of the lottery is a convincing image of
real world wage bargaining. However, bargaining solutions which abstain from using lotteries are also problem-
atic. For instance, Conley and Wilkie (1996) propose an extended Nash bargaining solution for nonconvex but
comprehensible bargaining problems. Their approach is not applicable to our problem as the smallest comprehen-
sible set of the bargaining frontier (4) has a jump at the limit wage e w. Moreover, Conley and Wilkie￿ s proposed
solution is not necessarily strictly Pareto-e¢ cient (see Hougaard and Tvede 2010, for a solution which requires
strict Pareto-e¢ ciency but lacks a noncoorporative implementation).
10If RD
1 ￿ ￿￿1 > RM









1 + ￿￿1) for RM
1 ￿ e w￿1 ￿ e w￿1 ￿ ￿￿1
[p￿ e w + (1 ￿ p￿)￿] for RM









, so that entry is deterred for sure or with probability p￿.
The ￿rst part of Proposition 2 follows directly from applying the split-the-surplus rule and
taking notice of the corner solution. The second part of Proposition 2 follows from applying
the split-the-surplus rule to the convexi￿ed problem. In particular, whenever the Nash solution
requires to use a lottery, then the lottery must guarantee that the expected net joint surplus is
shared equally which gives the condition
[p￿ e w + (1 ￿ p￿)￿]￿1 ￿ ￿￿1 = p￿(RM
1 ￿ e w￿1) + (1 ￿ p￿)(RD
1 ￿ ￿￿1), (7)
from which we obtain p￿ as stated in Proposition 2.
We are now in a position to analyze how the parameters of our model a⁄ect the likelihood
of a monopoly outcome where the union and the incumbent agree on a minimum wage which
deters entry. From Proposition 1 we observe that deterrence for sure depends on the condition
RM
1 ￿ e w￿1 > e w￿1 ￿ ￿￿1 being ful￿lled. We can rewrite that condition as follows
f := (e w￿1 ￿ ￿￿1) ￿ RM












Di⁄erentiation of f(￿) gives @f=@￿1 > 0, @f=@￿2 < 0 and @f=@￿ < 0.










Di⁄erentiation of g(￿) yields @g=@￿ > 0 and @g=@￿1 < 0. It is now straightforward to establish
the following corollary.
Corollary 1. Deterrence of the entrant for sure becomes more likely and the probability of a
limit wage, p￿, increases, whenever the cost e¢ ciency or the network e¢ ciency of the entrant
decreases (i.e., ￿ or ￿2 increases, resp.) or the network e¢ ciency of the incumbent increases
(i.e., ￿1 decreases).
11Clearly, a bargaining outcome with w ￿ e wbecomes more likely for higher values of the
entrant￿ s marginal costs (￿) and larger (lower) values of the network e¢ ciency parameter ￿2
(￿1). Inspection of the probability p￿ which solves the split-the-surplus condition (7) in expected
terms, shows that p￿ (i.e., the probability of choosing e w) increases as well when entry deterrence
for sure becomes more likely. Interestingly, an increasing value of ￿ and a decreasing value
of ￿1 which both shift the extremal point RD
1 ￿ ￿￿1 of the bargaining set outward, induce the
bargaining parties to settle on a higher probability of choosing e w under the lottery solution.
Hence, e⁄orts of the entrant to enhance its cost e¢ ciency would result in a lower probability of
entry (we come back to a similar phenomenon below in Section 4, where we study the entrant￿ s
incentives to invest into the coverage of its mail delivery network).
We now ask whether entry deterrence can occur for sure even when the entrant is more
e¢ cient. Let us assume for a moment that both ￿rms have the same network e¢ ciency (i.e.,
￿1 = ￿2). To simplify, let us also assume that workers￿reservation wage takes the value of zero.



















Hence, for all ￿ 2 [￿(2￿3=
p
2)=4;0) wage bargaining under an extension rule induces deterrence
of a more cost e¢ cient rival.
Let us next assume that both ￿rms have the same cost e¢ ciency (i.e., ￿ = 0) but may di⁄er
in their network e¢ ciencies (￿1, ￿2). Again, setting the reservation wage to zero, we then obtain

















Hence, with an extension rule existing, an incumbent can deter a rival operator with a more
e¢ cient delivery network if ￿2=￿1 2 (8=9;1] holds. We summarize those results in the following
corollary.
Corollary 2. Suppose ￿ = 0. If ￿2=￿1 = 1, then a more cost e¢ cient entrant is deterred from
entry for sure for all ￿ 2 [￿(2 ￿ 3=
p
2)=4;0). If ￿ = 0, then an entrant with a more e¢ cient
network is deterred from entry for sure for all ￿2=￿1 2 (8=9;1]. Moreover, when the bargaining
parties use a lottery to share their expected joint surplus, then deterrence of a more e¢ cient
entrant always occurs with some strictly positive probability.
12Comparison of labor market regimes. Comparing the wage rate agreed upon when no
extension rule is in place with the case where an extension rule obliges the entrant to pay the
minimum wage, we arrive at the following result.
Corollary 3. The (expected) wage rate under a regime with an extension rule is strictly larger
when compared with a regime where no such rule exists. Moreover, the union￿ s (expected) wage
bill and the incumbent￿ s (expected) pro￿t are both strictly larger under an extension rule.
Corollary 3 shows that the usually assumed con￿ ict of interest between a ￿rm and its union
in wage bargaining may be absent in the presence of market entry, whenever the wage rate can be
used to raise rivals￿costs. In contrast to deterrence models where the deterrence instrument (as,
e.g., sunk costs in Dewatripont 1987) di⁄ers from the rent-sharing instrument, a minimum wage
which combines both functions in a single instrument partly eliminates the supposed con￿ ict.
The reason for this result is that the ￿rm may wants to deter entry through a relatively large
minimum wage which is also in the interest of the union. However, the con￿ ict of interest does
not disappear completely as the ￿rm tries to pocket as much as possible from the monopoly
rents.
We conclude the analysis of our model with some remarks on overall productive e¢ ciency
as measured by mail unit costs. We compare the labor market regime without an extension rule
with the labor market regime with an extension rule. We focus on the case that entry is deterred
for sure if an extension is in place. Unit mail cost when no extension rule is in place is given by
cx￿
1 + (c + ￿)x￿











Inspection of both expressions (8) and (9) reveals the basic trade-o⁄ of an extension rule in
terms of unit mail costs. As is well-known duplication of ￿xed costs under duopoly tends to
make a monopoly outcome more attractive. However, a monopoly outcome under an extension
rule has three main drawbacks: ￿rst, it reduces total mail volume (x￿
1 + x￿
2 > xM
1 ), second, it
increases wage demands by the union of the incumbent ￿rm (w > b w1 > ￿), and third, it may
deter a more e¢ cient rival from entering the market. Taking those e⁄ects together a duopoly
13outcome might be very well more desirable, even in an industry exhibiting features of a natural
monopoly.
To show that overall mail unit cost can be smaller under duopoly in the absence of an
extension rule, let us shortly analyze the case of ￿ = 0, so that x￿
1 = x￿
2. Using expressions (8)











which assures that mail unit costs are smaller under duopoly when compared with a labor market
in which an extension rule allows the union and the incumbent to settle on an entry deterring
minimum wage. Clearly, such an outcome is more likely the higher the relative network e¢ ciency
of the entrant.
4 Endogenous Coverage
Until now we assumed that both ￿rms compete head-to-head in the mail delivery market. Both
￿rms were supposed to provide full coverage and the e¢ ciency levels of their delivery networks
were given exogenously. In reality, however, the decision about the coverage of a ￿rm￿ s delivery
network should be endogenous (see Valletti et al. 2002). Because of universal service regulation
the incumbent may not have the choice to reduce its coverage below full coverage. Accordingly,
we suppose that the incumbent must provide a full coverage delivery network. We assume that
the entrant ￿rm, however, can decide freely about the coverage of its delivery network.
We abstract from any e¢ ciency di⁄erences between both ￿rms. We assume ￿ = 0 and we
suppose that the ￿xed costs of running the mail delivery network are a linear function of each
￿rm￿ s coverage, si 2 [0;1]. The incumbent is assumed to have full coverage with ￿1 = ￿, while
the entrant can choose its coverage level, so that ￿2 = ￿s2.
We assume that the mail demand schedule X = a ￿ p is the aggregate of a continuum of
symmetric delivery markets with total mass of one. Suppose now that the entrant serves the
fraction s2 of all markets. Then the fraction s2 of all delivery markets are served by both the
entrant and the incumbent, while the remaining fraction 1 ￿ s2 is only served by the incum-
bent. For expositional purposes, we suppose that the incumbent can discriminate between the
duopolistic delivery markets and the markets where it holds a monopoly position.
14Given the entrant enters the market in the ￿nal stage of the game with a coverage of s2,
the inverse demand in the duopoly delivery markets is given by pD = a ￿ (1=s2)(x1 + x2).
Accordingly, the inverse demand in the monopoly segment is given by pM = a ￿ [1=(1 ￿ s2)]y1,
where xi (i = 1;2) denotes the ￿rms￿mail volume levels in the duopoly segment and y1 stands
for the incumbent￿ s mail volume in the monopolistic segment.
Solving for the optimal quantities in the duopoly segment we obtain x￿
1 = x￿
2 = s2(￿=3)
which gives rise to net revenues of s2RD for each ￿rm. Accordingly, we obtain for the monopoly
segment the optimal output level yM
1 = (1￿s2)(￿=2) which leads to net revenues of (1￿s2)RM
1
for the incumbent ￿rm.
We suppose that the entrant ￿rm must incur sunk costs to build up a delivery network in
an initial stage before the above analyzed two-stage game starts. We specify that the costs to
build up a delivery network with coverage s2 are given by the investment function K(s2) = s￿
2
with ￿ > 1. Note that 1=￿ measures the (constant) cost elasticity of coverage. Hence, a one
percentage increase of investment cost leads to a percentage increase of coverage below one per
cent.
We are now in a position to fully analyze a three-stage game, where the entrant chooses its
coverage in the initial stage while the next two stages remain the same as before.
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￿￿1 if ￿ > RD ￿ ￿￿
1 if ￿ ￿ RD ￿ ￿￿.
(10)
Clearly, a full coverage outcome becomes more likely, the larger the marginal rents of investment,
RD ￿ ￿￿, and the larger the cost elasticity of coverage, 1=￿.
We next turn to the case when an extension rule makes the wage contract between the
incumbent and the union generally binding. We ￿rst observe that the limit wage is independent
of the entrant￿ s coverage decision. As investments into the build-up of the delivery network
constitute sunk costs, the limit wage ful￿lls s2RD ￿ ￿s2 e w = 0 which holds for all s2 > 0 if and
only if e w = (1=￿)RD. A su¢ cient condition for an entry deterrence outcome is (see Proposition
152)
RM
1 ￿ e w￿ ￿ s2RD + (1 ￿ s2)RM
1 ￿ ￿￿. (11)
In those instances, the incumbent could realize a larger surplus under an entry deterring wage
than under the duopoly outcome at the workers￿reservation wage if it had all the bargaining
power. Such an outcome becomes the more likely the larger the entrant￿ s coverage becomes as
the right-hand side of (11) is monotonically decreasing in s2. The condition is, however, never
binding, whenever
￿￿ < 2RD ￿ RM
1 (12)
holds. Incidentally, if Condition (12) holds, then the Nash bargaining solution always requires to
use a lottery to resolve the negotiations between the incumbent and the union.7 We, therefore,
obtained the following lemma.
Lemma 1. If ￿￿ ￿ 2RD ￿ RM
1 , then entry is deterred for sure and the entrant does not invest
into building up a mail delivery network. If, to the contrary, ￿￿ < 2RD ￿ RM
1 holds, then entry
is deterred with probability p￿ for all s2 2 [0;1].
Lemma 1 highlights the power of minimum wages as a deterrence instrument. Given that
workers￿reservation wage, ￿, and/or the labor-intensity of operating the mail delivery network,
￿, is relatively high, then an entrant ￿rm will never build up a delivery network if an extension
rule is enforced. Comparison with the entrant￿ s optimal coverage decision in the absence of
an extension rule (10) shows that there can exist instances in which the entrant would have
otherwise build up a full coverage delivery network.
By Lemma 1, the entrant only invests into a delivery network if Condition (12) holds which
implies that the incumbent and the union revert to a lottery to resolve their wage negotiations.
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￿
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Note that @p￿=@s2 > 0, so that the probability of an entry deterring wage increases in the
entrant￿ s coverage. Di⁄erentiation of the entrant￿ s pro￿t function (13) with respect to s2 yields
7By Proposition 2, we know that the Nash bargaining solution chooses a point on the convexi￿ed part of the
bargaining frontier if R
M
1 ￿ e w￿ < e w￿ ￿ ￿￿ which is equivalent to ￿￿ < 2R
D ￿ R
M




then Condition (11) is never ful￿lled for all s2 > 0.
16the ￿rst-order condition for an interior solution
￿




(RD ￿ ￿￿) = ￿s￿￿1
2 , (14)
where the left-hand side is the marginal rent of investment. The left-hand side of Condition (14)
is clearly smaller than the marginal rent of investment in the absence of an extension regulation
(which is equal to RD ￿ ￿￿). Two reasons are responsible for this result: ￿rst, successful entry
only occurs with some probability 1 ￿ p￿ < 1, and second, the bargaining parties react to an
increase of the entrant￿ s coverage by increasing the probability of an entry deterring wage (i.e.,
@p￿=@s2 > 0).
Denote the solution to the maximization problem (13) by s￿￿
2 and let us focus on interior
solutions, s￿
2, when no extension rules exists. The following proposition is then immediate.
Proposition 3. If ￿￿ ￿ 2RD￿RM
1 , then the entrant does not invest into building up a delivery
network under an extension rule. If, to the contrary, ￿￿ < 2RD ￿ RM
1 holds, then the entrant
invests strictly less under an extension rule when compared with the investment level s￿
2 for
￿ > RD ￿ ￿￿ in the absence of an extension rule; i.e., s￿￿
2 < s￿
2.
Proposition 3 makes clear that for a large enough reservation wage bill, ￿￿, an entrant
will never invest into building up its own delivery network irrespectively of its investment cost
function K(s2). Moreover, if investments take place, then the entrant will enter with a network
which entails a smaller coverage when compared with the case without an extension rule. Overall,
having analyzed a richer model with endogenous coverage we are left with the observation
that minimum wage legislation unfolds additional adverse dynamics e⁄ects on the entrant￿ s
willingness to invest into the coverage of its own mail delivery network.
In the next sections we relate our analysis to recent minimum wage legislation in Germany.
We ￿rst describe the relevant labor laws which implement minimum wages at the industry-level.
We then examine the Deutsche Post case which highlights the raising rivals￿cost incentives
when labor laws exist which make the collective wage agreement between incumbents generally
binding. Our investigation of that case shows that the main predictions of our model mirror
nicely what actually happened in reality.
175 The German Collective Bargaining System
In this section we shortly describe the legal foundations of the German system of collective
bargaining. We describe the traditional procedure of declaring wage contracts generally binding
by means of extension regulation. We then describe most recent minimum wage legislation which
has signi￿cantly increased the scope for making wage contracts generally binding.
The legal basis of collective bargaining. In Germany wage bargaining occurs mainly
at the sectorial level between an industry union and an employer association representing most
of the ￿rms in the industry.8 Those collective negotiations usually result in standard wages and
labor contracts which cover almost all ￿rms and workers in the industry. This so-called area
tari⁄ system (￿Fl￿chentarifsystem￿ ) still dominates the German labor market. As has been
argued by Haucap et al. (2006, 2007) the stability of the area tari⁄ system in Germany is
mainly externally supported by various labor market regulations which systematically protect
the collective bargaining system against deviant behavior and outside competition.
One core institution of the German system of collective bargaining is the so-called tari⁄
autonomy (￿Tarifautonomie￿ ) which empowers unions, employers and employer associations to
form coalitions and to bargain collectively.9 The principle of tari⁄autonomy protects the ￿social
partners￿to strike collective agreements on their own and, with that, makes outright minimum
wage setting through state intervention virtually impossible.
The legal nature of the collective bargaining process is speci￿ed in the Collective Agreements
Act (￿Tarifvertragsgesetz￿ , in short: TVG). According to the TVG only the tari⁄parties (unions,
￿rms, and employer associations) can conclude collective labor contracts. Most unions (as the
united services union - ￿Vereinigte Dienstleistungsgewerkschaft￿ , in short: Verdi) are organized
within the German confederation of trade unions (￿Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund￿ , in short:
DGB). While there is no doubt that all unions which are members of the DGB have the right
8Labor markets and labor laws di⁄er substantially between countries (see, e.g., Nickell 1997, OECD 1997,
or Blau and Kahn 1999). A salient dimension that di⁄erentiates national labor markets is the degree of wage
setting centralization (Calmfors and Dri¢ ll 1988 and Wallerstein 1999). From this angle Germany￿ s collective
wage bargaining system is somehow positioned in the middle between a decentralized system (with collective
bargaining at the ￿rm level) and a fully centralized system (with collective bargaining at the national level).
9The legal grounds for the tari⁄ autonomy can be found in Article 9 Paragraph 3 of the German Constitution
(￿Grundgesetz￿ ) and the law concerning tari⁄ agreements (￿Tarifvertragsgesetz￿ ).
18to conclude tari⁄ agreement, this is typically not the case for outsider unions.10 In fact, as
summarized in Haucap et al. (2006, pp. 365⁄.) legal practice and the legal literature have
arranged extremely restrictive conditions which have to be ful￿lled so that a worker association
should be regarded as eligible to conclude collective agreements (see Wiedemann and Stumpf
1977, pp. 357⁄.).11
The TVG states that in general only members of the bargaining parties are actually bound
to obey the regulations of the tari⁄ contract. In practice, though, a ￿rm which is member of an
employer association pays the tari⁄ wage to all of its employees (for the reasons see Haucap et
al. 2006, p. 363).
Traditional extension rule. While there are many stabilizers of the area tari⁄ system,
a stabilizer of last resort is provided by the possibility to make collective bargaining contracts
compulsory for all unorganized employers (and hence, all unorganized workers) within an indus-
try by an extension rule. Speci￿cally, paragraph 5 of TVG provides the bargaining parties with
such a device, the so-called ￿Allgemeinverbindlicherkl￿rung￿(in short: AVE). The ￿rst prereq-
uisite to declare an employment contract to be generally binding is the existence of a collective
bargaining agreement in accordance with TVG; i.e., a collective contract between a union and
an employer association at the industry level. Secondly, at least 50 per cent of employees in
the tari⁄ area for which an AVE is initiated have to be employed in ￿rms of contract-bound
employers and the AVE must be ￿in the public interest￿ .
The implementation of the AVE is regulated in the TVG. Initially, one of the bargaining
parties must apply for an AVE at the Ministry of Labor. Unorganized employees and employers
concerned, as well as employer associations, unions and the Ministry of Labor of the state
a⁄ected by the AVE are given the right to express their opinion. Afterwards a public hearing of
10The case of the Christliche Gewerkschaft Metall (CGM) which is a member of the Christliche Gewerkschafts-
bund (CGB) is instructive in this regard. Ever since its appearance, the dominant union Industriegewerkschaft
Metall (IGM) (which is member of the DGB) has continuously tried to challenge the right of the CGM to strike
collective agreements (see Haucap et al. 2006).
11An exceptionally restrictive condition is the so-called mightiness (￿social power￿ ) requirement which unfolds
a vicious circle that ulimately counters attempts to establish a new rival union. According to the Federal Labor
Court an indication for the existence of social power comes from the fact whether the union already concluded
collective agreements. Obviously, the incumbent union meets this requirement but a new union can hardly refer
to collective contracting in the past.
19a council consisting of three representatives of umbrella organizations of unions and employers
respectively (￿Tarifausschuss￿ ) is initiated. The council then decides with the majority of votes
whether or not to recommend the use of an AVE to the Ministry of Labor. Though the Ministry
of Labor is not bound by the council￿ s recommendation, it nevertheless has proved to a⁄ect the
ministry￿ s ￿nal decision. Once an AVE has been put into force, it remains e⁄ective until the
collective bargaining contract expires or the Ministry of Labor puts the AVE out of force.
Posted Workers Act. The Posted Workers Act (￿Arbeitnehmer-Entsendegesetz￿ , in short:
AEntG) came into force in 1996 and has been revised several times later on (the latest version
dates back to April 20th, 2009). Its original objective was to ensure binding labor standards
for workers employed by businesses of foreign origin (with a focus on construction workers).
Yet, right from the beginning it was clear that the act could also be used to force all employers
(including nonorganized domestic ￿rms) in a certain sector to adhere to the same working
standards and, in particular, minimum wages. In fact, as of today the Act￿ s main purpose has
become to enforce minimum wages in several service sectors on domestic ￿rms.
The Posted Workers Act reduced signi￿cantly the bar for the German Federal Ministry
of Labor to implement minimum wages when compared with the traditional extension rule
according to the TVG. First, it allows to declare a collective wage contract generally binding
even if less than 50 per cent of the employees of the tari⁄ area concerned are employed by
contract-bound ￿rms.12 Second, until 2009 the Act did not require a public hearing of a council
consisting of the involved umbrella organizations.13 Finally, the Ministry of Labor can declare
a wage contract generally binding by legal decree (￿Rechtsverordnung￿ ) without having to go
through a complicated procedure as required under the TVG.14
The Act does not apply automatically to all service sectors. Instead, the Act explicitly
12In the latest version of the Posted Workers Act a representativeness requirement was introduced which applies
to those industry where competing collective labor contracts exist. A collective contract is more ￿representative￿
if both the number of workers employed by contract-bound employers and the number of union members a⁄ected
by the tari⁄ agreement are larger (see also Blanke 2007).
13In its latest version of 2009, the Posted Workers Act was supplemented by a paragraph which requires the
Ministry of Labor to ask the involved bargaining parties as well as the parties of competing collective agreements
(if applicable) for their statements.
14For example, under the TVG the Labor Ministry of a Land can block an AVE in which case the Federal
Ministry of Labor must ask the Federal Government for permission.
20states the sectors which can apply for a minimum wage ruling. Initially, the Act only mentioned
the construction industry. By the end of 2007 (shortly before full liberalization) mail delivery
services and, most recently, several other sectors have been added (as, e.g., commercial cleaning
and waste management).
6 The Deutsche Post Case
In Germany, the transition period towards full liberalization started on January 1st, 1998 with
the implementation of the ￿rst EU Directive (97/67/EC) on postal service markets.15 Initially,
it was planned to liberalize the postal service market fully on January 1st, 2003. However, prior
to that date, Germany￿ s Federal Government decided to renew Deutsche Post￿ s monopoly for
letter services for ￿ve more years. At the latest, in winter 2006/2007 it became clear that the
then ruling Federal Government was committed to liberalize the postal service market fully on
January 1st, 2008.
In the following we ￿rst describe the road towards the introduction of minimum wages in the
postal sector in Germany just prior to full liberalization. Then, we describe how the minimum
wages a⁄ected competitors￿businesses and we touch on the legal disputes which followed.
The road towards minimum wages. With full liberalization of the postal market in
prospect, labor unions (in particular, Verdi) and several political parties called for the introduc-
tion of minimum wage legislation in the postal service sector. It was claimed that wage dumping
at the expense of established postal workers should be prevented this way.16
Prior to liberalization, Deutsche Post had signi￿cantly restructured operations; e.g., through
outsourcing of post o¢ ces and transport services, while the mail delivery network has been kept
inhouse. At that time, virtually all operators who entered the not reserved area provided end-to-
end services, many of them at a local or regional level, competing with Deutsche Post through
alliances. Until full liberalization in 2008, the reserved area included letters up to 50 grams
15In the EU, the stepwise liberalization process of the market for postal services is governed by three EU
Directives; namely, Directive 97/67/EC, Directive 2002/39/EC, and Directive 2008/06/EC, where the latter one
requires the member states to abolish any remaining reserved areas by 2010.
16The release of a study on the allegedly precarious employment conditions at the postal service competitors
triggered an intense debate about this issue (Input Consulting 2006).
21(with some exceptions for large senders). Competition that emerged prior to 2008 was mainly in
the area of value-added services as little requirements had to be ful￿lled to operate outside the
reserved area (Dieke and Wojtek 2008). Deutsche Post claimed that its disadvantage of having
relatively high wages due to the former legal status of its employees as civil servants requires
the implementation of minimum wage legislation in order to ensure a level playing ￿eld.
In August 2007, the Federal Government (consisting of a grand coalition) reached an agree-
ment to support the introduction of minimum wages in the postal sector via amendment of the
Posted Workers Act.17 The exact details, however, were left open until the end of 2007. Given
the political support for minimum wages, a series of strategic moves by the involved parties
followed quickly.
On August 28th, 2007 the Postal Employer Association (Arbeitgeberverband Postdienste, in
short: AGV Postdienste) was established. It was obvious that the AGV Postdienste was domi-
nated by the Deutsche Post and its subsidiaries.18 At that time the competitors proclaimed that
the establishment of AGV Postdienste was a strategic move to implement excessive minimum
wages in order to drive them out of the market after full liberalization.
On September 4th, 2007 the newly founded AGV Postdienste and Verdi reached a collective
wage agreement which was intended to serve as the reference contract for minimum wages in
the postal service sector.19 Accordingly, the contract was ￿led to the Federal Ministry of Labor
to be declared generally binding. The tari⁄ contract stipulated a general minimum wage per
hour of e 8.00 and e 8.40 in East Germany and West Germany, respectively. Speci￿cally, the
minimum wage for mail delivery was set even higher at e 9.00 and e 9.80 in East Germany and
West Germany, respectively. The contract stipulates that those minimum wages should become
e⁄ective on December 1st, 2007.20 However, the contract provides an extraordinary termination
17See ￿Bundesregierung beschlie￿ t Mindestlohn f￿r Brief-Branche,￿ 22 August, 2007 (www.post-und-
telekommunikation.de).
18At court hearings in 2009, the most important competitors claimed that they did not have the opportunity
to join the association or to take part in the negotiations. See German Parliament, Commission for Labor and
Social A⁄airs, meeting protocol 16/65, statement of F. Gerster, p. 875.
19The contract is posted on the website of AGV Postdienste (www.agv-postdienste.de).
20See ￿Mindestlohn im Postbereich vereinbart,￿Handelsblatt online (www.handelsblatt.com). The tari⁄ con-
tract was signed on 29 November, 2007 (www.verdi.de).
22clause which becomes e⁄ective if and only if the contract is not declared generally binding as an
industry-wide minimum wage.21
To investigate the actual working conditions in the postal industry, the Federal Network
Agency (￿Bundesnetzagentur￿ ) conducted a survey about working conditions at licensed postal
service operators from summer to autumn 2007 (BNetzA 2008). Table 1 provides an overview
of the results concerning the prevailing wages.
Table 1: Industry wages before the introduction of the minimum wage (BNetzA 2008)
Deutsche Competitors
Post AG West East Average
Sorters 11.34 8.10 6.11 7.68
Drivers 11.99 8.08 6.23 7.73
Delivery postmen 12.13 7.71 6.18 7.28
Administrative sta⁄ 16.01 11.24 9.23 10.97
Average 13.04 8.23 6.38 7.79
Focusing on wages per hour for postmen, Table 1 clearly shows that the tari⁄ agreement
between AGV Postdienste and Verdi set minimum wages which exceeded the average wage rates
paid by competitors by 20-30 per cent. The average wage rate of e 12.13 calculated for the
Deutsche Post should be treated with caution. This relatively high wage rate mirrors on the
one hand Deutsche Post￿ s burden of having senior postmen who still enjoy the bene￿ts of civil
servant status or similar working contracts. However, the wage rate Deutsche Post￿ s partner
￿rms have been paying for new employees (including postmen) are substantially lower and have
been even lower than the minimum wage set in the tari⁄ contract between AGV Postdienste
and Verdi.22
Needless to say, the competitors immediately complained heavily about the high wage levels
and the procedure how the tari⁄s have been agreed upon. Another issue was the coverage
21Precisely, article 6, paragraph 3 of the tari⁄ contract stipulates: ￿Both parties have an extraordinary termi-
nation right if the contract is not declared generally binding according to the Collective Agreements Act and the
Posted Workers Act. In that case [...] the contract can be terminated within a period of one week by the end of
the calendar month.￿
22For details, see BNetzA (2008) and Dieke and Zauner (2007).
23of the tari⁄ agreement. Initially, it was planned that the tari⁄ agreement should hold for all
￿rms delivering letters no matter of the ￿rms￿core business (as, e.g., publishing and newspaper
delivery). By November 29th, 2007 the draft of the wage contract was revised such that it only
applied to ￿rms with letter delivery being their core business.23
The main competitors responded on September 18th, 2007 with the establishment of a new
employer association ￿Arbeitgeberverband Neue Brief- und Zustelldienste￿(in short: AGV Neue
BuZ) which immediately claimed, a minimum wage would be reasonable and acceptable if it was
between e 6.00 and e 7.50.24
In the mean time, a new union for new letter and delivery services (Gewerkschaft Neue Brief-
und Zustelldienste, in short: GNBZ) was founded which concluded a wage contract with the
new employer association AGV Neue BuZ which stipulated a general minimum wage per hour
of 6.50 e and 7.50 e for East Germany and West Germany, respectively. That contract was also
submitted to the Federal Ministry of Labour to serve as an alternative proposal for a mandatory
minimum wage.25
Market surveys conducted by the Federal Network Agency revealed that the introduction
of a minimum wage by means of the extension rule of the TVG would be problematic, as the
wage contract between AGV Postdienste and Verdi hardly represented at least 50 per cent of
the employees in postal delivery services that had to be employed in ￿rms of contract-bound
employers according to the TVG.26
Hence, a minimum wage would critically depend on a revision of the Posted Workers Act
by adding letter delivery services to the sectors eligible for a minimum wage regulation. On
December 20th, 2007 the amended Act (BMAS 2007) which now included letter services, was
passed by the Upper House (￿Bundesrat￿ ). On December 28th, 2007 a decree was issued by
the Federal Labor Ministry, declaring the wage contract between Verdi and AGV Postdienste
generally binding for all mail service providers. The decree became e⁄ective on January 1st,
2008 and was set to expire by April 31st, 2010.
Impact on competition. The extension of the wage contract between Verdi and AGV
23See ￿Koalition einigt sich auf Post-Mindestlohn,￿Spiegel online, November 29th, 2007 (www.spiegel.de).
24See Press Release of the AGV Neue BuZ, 27 September, 2007 (www.agv-nbz.de).
25See BdKEP Press Release, 12 December, 2007 (www.bdkep.de).
26See BNetzA (2008).
24Postdienste by means of the Posted Workers Act had a strong and lasting impact on the com-
petitors￿businesses. Overall, the minimum wage is widely considered as detrimental to the
development of competition in the German mail market. According to a statement of the Ger-
man Federal Government, 153 postal service companies shut down operations in 2008-2009 and
about 19.000 jobs had been cut.27
In the ￿rst quarter of 2008, the PIN group ￿led insolvency after its main shareholder, the
Axel Springer group, had withdrawn of its postal operations already in December 2007. Since
then the PIN group has been run by an insolvency administrator. It paid the minimum wage
while being subsidized out of public social security funds (Ecorys 2008). In the ￿rst quarter 2008,
about 50 per cent of formerly about 11,400 jobs have been slashed, so that the delivery network
has been cut down substantially (already in February 2008, 37 of approximately 91 companies
of the PIN group ￿led bankruptcy). While the insolvency administrator tried to preserve the
PIN group as a whole, it later turned out, that a more viable solution was to sell the di⁄erent
regional companies separately. The publishing house Holtzbrinck bought twelve PIN ￿rms in
metropolitan areas. In mid-sized cities regional publishers took over several other PIN ￿rms.
Subsidiaries of PIN in smaller towns and rural areas often could neither be preserved nor sold
to other ￿rms and had to shut down operations all together.
Turning to the other main competitor TNT, the picture is somewhat di⁄erent. Right after
the introduction of minimum wages, TNT announced that it is seriously considering withdrawal
from the German market as a consequence of the minimum wage. Interestingly, TNT decided not
to pay the minimum wages but kept its own lower wage rates e⁄ective. This decision, though,
did also put an additional ￿nancial burden on the company as it had to build up reserves for
the wage di⁄erential and associated social security contributions. However, shortly after the
Federal Administrative Court￿ s judgement that the minimum wages are void TNT announced
new plans to extend its area coverage and delivery frequency.
Finally, as competing postal operators relied on building alliances with partner ￿rms to reach
nearly full geographic coverage, market exit of small regional players has resulted in reductions
27See the reply of the Federal Government to the inquiry of the parliamentary group of the liberal party
(FDP) (available at http://dip21.bundestag.de/dip21/btd/16/091/1609192.pdf) and Press Release of the Federal
Network Agency (available at http://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/media/archive/15280.pdf).
25of the main competitors coverage. For example, it is documented in Ecorys (2008) that as a
consequence of partner insolvency, the coverage of the TNT network went down from 93 to 87
per cent in Germany.28
Legal disputes. With the implementation of minimum wages a series of legal disputes
have been triggered which are not fully settled until today. On January 9th, 2008, TNT and
other competitors (organized in the new employer association AGB Neue BuZ) ￿led a lawsuit
against the German Federal Government. They insisted on their constitutional right to con-
clude a collective wage agreement on their own (namely, the tari⁄ contract concluded in 2007
between the AGV Neue BuZ and GNBZ).29 On March 7th, 2008, the Berlin Administrative
Court (￿Verwaltungsgericht￿ ) declared the minimum wage void. The court argued that the
Federal Government was not empowered by the Posted Workers Act to overturn a competing
collective contract by declaring another collective tari⁄ contract generally binding. By that, the
court clari￿ed that a minimum wage can only be imposed on employers and workers not bound
by any tari⁄ agreement.30
The Federal Labor Ministry appealed and on January 28th, 2010, the Federal Administrative
Court (￿Bundverwaltungsgericht￿ ) ￿nally judged the declaration of the minimum wage void due
to formal defects. In its decision the court argued that the Federal Labor Ministry had failed to
give other a⁄ected parties the opportunity to comment prior to issuing of the ordinance. As a
consequence, the minimum wage immediately was not binding anymore for the plainti⁄s, while
28Meanwhile, by January 2010, TNT, Holtzbrinck, Madsack, Citipost and some other companies in the mailing
industry founded the Mail Alliance which started operations on January 25th, 2010. Their o⁄erings are limited to
￿rms and institutions, but include hybrid mail. Coverage is claimed to be nation-wide with a conveyance speed
of E+2. The wages paid by the companies of the alliance are mainly in the range of e 6.50 to e 7.50 (see the
Mail Alliance￿website: www.mailalliance.net).
29At the EU level, the Federal Association of International Express and Courier Companies (￿Bundesverband
Internationaler Express- und Kurierdienste￿ ) ￿led a complaint addressed to the European Commission. It was
argued that the minimum wage agreement￿ s only objective was to block competition. In additon, TNT ￿led
a complaint against the German government based on Art. 82 of the European Treaty. It was claimed that
the minimum wage decree leads to an unfair infringement on competition and violates the freedom to establish
business throughout the European Union by raising rivals￿costs. The European Commission￿ s DG Internal Market
announced to examine the issue.
30See Berlin Administrative Court (2008): Decision VG 4 A 439.07.
26it remained in force for unorganized competitors.
There is, however, still uncertainty whether the minimum wage decree is valid from its
beginning. To make things even more complicated on February 13th, 2009, a new amendment
of the Posted Workers Act was put into force which should cure the Act￿ s shortcomings when
more than one collective contract has been concluded in the same sector. First, the amendment
speci￿es a new ￿representativeness￿criterion which should guide the Federal Labor Ministry￿ s
decision which tari⁄ contract to select as the basis for an extension rule when more than one
collective contract exist. Second, the amendment incorporates a procedure of hearings of the
a⁄ected parties into the Act which was missing in the former version. Those amendments have
been acknowledged by legal experts as su¢ cient to guarantee that a minimum wage based on
the collective contract between Verdi and AGV Postdienste could stand the test of a labor court
(see Blanke 2007).
The new amendment is closely related to Verdi￿ s accusation that the new union GNBZ is
not empowered to conclude collective labor contracts. Verdi argued that the GNBZ does not
meet the minimum standards a ￿tari⁄-enabled￿union must ful￿ll according to the TVG.31 On
October 30th, 2008 the Cologne Labor Court (￿Arbeitsgericht￿ ) denied that the GNBZ is a
tari⁄-enabled union in the sense of the TVG. Accordingly, the wage contract between AGV
Neue BuZ and GNBZ was declared as void by the court. This court ruling together with the
Federal Government￿ s political commitment to ￿nd ways to implement minimum wages has been
in￿ icting considerable uncertainty on the viability of the competitors￿future businesses. Both
GNBZ and AGV Neue BuZ appealed against the court ruling, but in the meantime both parties
withdraw their appeals.
7 Conclusion
In this paper we analyzed how minimum wage legislation in the form of extension rulings can be
used by collective bargaining partners to deter entry or to drive existing competitors out of the
market. Our main application is the postal service industry where the labor costs of running a
31See Blanke (2007) for an expert￿ s report which argues that the new union should not be regarded as tari⁄-
enabled according to the TVG. That study also argues that the ￿representativeness￿ criterion of the revised
Posted Workers Act requires to neglect the competing collective agreement.
27mail delivery network are mainly ￿xed operating costs. As it is the case in more standard raising
rivals￿costs models where wages a⁄ect a ￿rm￿ s marginal labor costs directly, wage increases can
be used to monopolize the ￿nal product market. However, there are several di⁄erences between
raising rivals￿ marginal and raising rivals￿ ￿xed labor costs. Most importantly, when labor
constitutes ￿xed costs, then the pro￿tability of a raising rivals￿costs strategy does not depend
on a su¢ cient e¢ ciency advantage of the incumbent ￿rm (which engages in the anticompetitive
practice) vis-￿-vis potential competitors. This observation has several implications. First, the
alleged con￿ ict of interest between the ￿rm and its union becomes less pronounced as it is
the case when wages are variable costs. When wages are variable costs a wage increase not
only distributes rents to the union but also tends to reduce the overall joint surplus available
because of the well-known double mark-up problem. Second, when wages are ￿xed costs then
an incumbent is able to deter entry through strategic wage increases even if the entrant ￿rm is
more e¢ cient. As a consequence, overall productive e¢ ciency can be reduced under a raising
rivals￿￿xed labor cost strategy.
We also showed that extension regulations may have adverse e⁄ects on competitors￿willing-
ness to invest into the coverage of their mail delivery networks. In the extreme case, entry is
completely deterred under an extension rule while an entrant may build a mail network with
full coverage when no such extension regulation exists.
The Deutsche Post case reveals the strong incentives of the incumbent ￿rm and the estab-
lished union (which cares only about its organized members employed by the incumbent) to
settle (strategically) on a relative high wage rate so as to harm competitors. The strategic
intention becomes obvious when one considers the fact that the tari⁄ contract specifying the
proposed minimum wages was made contingent on being declared generally binding by the Fed-
eral Government. As we have shown, both parties retained the right to terminate the agreement
otherwise.
We also described recent legal disputes which resulted from the Federal Government￿ s mini-
mum wage ruling. The most problematic issue has become the fact that the incumbent unions
(namely, the unions organized in the DGB) lost their monopoly position in the ￿market for col-
lective contracts.￿This is a rather new development in the German labor market, and the labor
institutions (which were designed for bilateral wage negotiations between a monopoly union and
28a monopolistic employer association at the industry-level) are still struggling to come to terms
with a competitive labor market.
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